




























From conceptual point of view, we argue about the nature of reality 
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2 The nature of Reality: Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Argument in Quantum Theory 
 
The Reality of EPR argument in Quantum Mechanics. 
 
The Einsteinian research programme can be summarized in the following way: 
 
Physical theories are attempts at saying how things are. The 
world is comprehensible. 
 
The above statement is a very general one, indeed this statement seems to be 
not enough to characterize uniquely Einstein’s programme. In fact, that state- 
ment is also perfectly adaptable to the Galilean, Cartesian, Newtonian, Leibnizian, 
Maxwellian and several other scientiﬁc programmes. According to Einstein, quan- 
tum objects are concrete entities existing in a space-time where causality holds. In 
the following statement the Einstein’s thought is more precise: 
 
Physical theories (including QM) are attempts at saying how things are 
(including quantum objects). The objective world is comprehensible. By 
the simultaneous help of space-time and causal conceptual categories we 
can study this comprehensible world. 
 
To make explicit Einstein’s claims in favor of objectivity and independence of real- 
ity1. In this framework we need to insert the EPR argument. In EPR work they 
demonstrated an inconsistency between the premises that go under the name of 
local realism and the notion that QM is complete. EPR never regarded it as a 
paradox, but as an argument to prove the incompleteness of QM. 
A passage in a letter from Einstein to Max Born, dated March 24, 1948, illuminates 
some of the key issues for Einstein that lie behind the EPR  paradox and what is at 
issue for him in his commitment to separability: 
1Instead, Bohr’s scientiﬁc research programme can be summarized in the following way: Classical 
theories are attempts at saying how things are. The objective classical world is comprehensible. By 
using both space-time and causal categories we can study the classical world, but not the quantum 
world. According to Bohr, quantum phenomena are not comprehensible in the same sense as clas- 
sical phenomena. In classical physics, objects are spatial and temporal entities that are ruled by 
causal laws. In this way, classical phenomena are comprehensible according to causal laws (conser- 
vation laws) in space-time. Thus in a classical context, the conceptual categories of space-time and 
cause can be used together to study physical phenomena. However, according to Bohr the situation 
changes drastically when we are dealing with quantum phenomena. In microphysics, the categories 
of space-time and cause can be used only in a mutually exclusive manner, according to Bohr’s com- 
plementarity principle. According Bohr, quantum theory must be interpreted, not as a description 
of nature itself, but merely as a tool for making predictions about observations appearing under 
conditions described by classical physics. In other words, although quantum phenomena cannot 
be described by simultaneous use of the space-time and causal concepts, the use of these 
and other classical physics concepts is unavoidable.
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I just want to explain what I mean when I say that we should try to hold 
on to physical reality [....] That which we conceive as existing ("actual") 
should somehow be localized in time and space. That is, the real in one 
patt of space, A, should (in theory) somehow "exist" independently of that 
which is thought of as real in another part of space, B [....] What is actually 
present in B  should thus not depend upon the type of measurement carried 
out in the part of space, A; it should also be independent of whether or 
not, after all, a measurement is made in A [... .] 
 
Einstein maintained a belief in separability2as the very condition for the 
possibility of objectivity. According Howard, (Howard, 2007) Einstein’s belief in 
separability in terms of a literal externality relation, the spatial separation between 
observer and observed: 
 
Like so many realists before him, Einstein speaks of the real world which 
physics aim to describe as the real "external" world, and he does so in such 
a way as to suggest that the independence of the real, its not being depen- 
dent in any signiﬁcant way on ourselves as observers-is grounded in this 
"externality." For most other realists this talk of "externality" is at best a 
suggestive metaphor. But for Einstein, it is no metaphor. "Externality" is 
a relation of spatial separation, and the separability principle, the principle 
of "the mutually independent existence of spatially distant things," asserts 
that any two systems separated by so much as an inﬁnitesimal spatial in- 
terval always possess separate states. Once we realize that observer and 
observed are themselves just previously interacting physical systems, we 
see that their independence is grounded in the separability principle along 
with the independence of all other physical systems. 
 
In this ﬁrst part of thesis, will be analyzed the EP R argument in detail because it 
contains the primitive notion of local causality used in discussions of Bell’s theorem 
and the notion of quantum non-separability (Cavalcanti, 2008). 
The original EPR paradox was based on position and momentum observables. Bohm 
in 1951 extended the example of EPR to the case of discrete observables (the case 
of two spin-1/2 particles). That is the version that was used by Bell in deriving 
his famous inequalities. It has played a central role in our understanding of QE.  
Both the original argument of EPR and Bohm’s version, however, rely on perfect 
2Bohr rejects the separability condition.For Bohr, the quantum postulate and the material embod- 
iment of concepts are at the root of quantum nonseparability (what Bohr often refers to as the 
"individuality" of phenomena).
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correlations. For EPR-entanglement, local realism can only be reconciled with QM if 
one accepts the existence of an underlying localized hidden variable (non-quantum) 
state. In few words, if one can accept only quantum states, then the EPR 
correlation implies nonlocal eﬀects3. 
The EPR paper starts (see below quotation) with a distinction between reality and 
the concepts of a theory, followed by a critique of the operationalist position (the 
Copenhagen school). 
 
"Any serious consideration of a physical theory must take into account 
the distinction between the objective reality, which is independent of 
any theory, and the physical concepts with which the theory operates. 
These concepts are intended to correspond with the objective reality, and 
by means of these concepts we picture this reality to ourselves. In attempt- 
ing to judge the success of a physical theory, we may ask ourselves two 
questions: (1) ‘Is the theory correct?’ and (2) ‘Is the description given 
by the theory complete?’ It is only in the case in which positive answers 
may be given to both of these questions, that the concepts of the theory 
may be said to be satisfactory. The correctness of the theory is judged by 
the degree of agreement between the conclusions of the theory and human 
experience. 
 
EPR argue that we must distinguish those concepts from the reality they attempt 
to describe. One can see the physical constructs of the theory as mere calcula- 
tional tools (operationalist position or FAPP). But according EPR the theory must 
 
3As we will see in details, in QM the term "nonlocality" refers to the failure of a certain relativity- 
theory-based locality assumption. This assumption is that no information about which experiment 
is freely chosen and performed in one spacetime region can be present in a second spacetime region 
unless a point traveling at the speed of light (or less) can reach some point in the second region from 
some point in the ﬁrst. This assumption is valid in relativistic classical physics. Yet quantum theory 
permits the existence of certain experimental situations in which this information-based locality 
assumption fails. The simplest of the experiments pertinent to this issue involve two measurements 
performed in two spacetime regions that lie so far apart that nothing traveling at the speed of light 
or less can pass from either of these two regions to the other. We will see that Bell’s work, based 
on EP R argument, refer only to performable actions and observable outcomes. Bell’s work do not 
analyze any notions of "microscopic", "invisible", or other "hidden variables". The assumptions 
are expressed at the macroscopic level. These assumptions cannot be consistently reconciled with 
the predictions of QM. Bell (1971) and others (Clauser et al,1969) went on to consider, instead of 
deterministic local hidden-variable theories, rather probabilistic local hidden variable theories. But, 
as shown by Stapp (1978), and independently by Fine (1982), this change does not substantially 
change the situation, because the two detailed formulations are equivalent.
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strive to furnish a complete picture of reality. The position advocated by Ein- 
stein, is that the existence of physical events is independent of observers 
or reference frames and that those events can be associated to points in 
a relativistic space-time. This framework makes explicit, as EP R desired, that 
events are among those things which are part of the objective reality4, which is in- 
dependent of any theory. EPR  follow the previous considerations with a necessary 
condition for completeness: 
 
EPR’s necessary condition for completeness: "Whatever the meaning 
assigned to the term complete, the following requirement for a complete 
theory seems to be a necessary one: every element of the physical reality 
must have a counterpart in the physical theory.".  
 
After they they note that this condition only makes sense if one is able to decide 
what are the elements of the physical reality. Contrary to a common belief, they 
did not then attempt to deﬁne element of physical reality. Instead, they provide a 
suﬃcient condition of reality : 
 
EPR’s suﬃcient condition for reality: "The elements of the physical 
reality cannot be determined by a priori philosophical considera- 
tions, but must be found by an appeal to results of experiments and mea- 
surements. A comprehensive deﬁnition of reality is, however, unnecessary 
for our purpose. We shall be satisﬁed with the following criterion, which 
we regard as reasonable. If, without in any way disturbing a system, 
we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the 
value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical 
reality corresponding to this physical quantity.". 
 
EPR follow the analysis and they explicit a criterion that can be "regarded not 
as a necessary, but merely as a suﬃcient, condition of reality". This is followed 
by a discussion that, in QM, if a system is in an eigenstate of an operator with 
eigenvalue , by this criterion, there must be an element of physical reality 
corresponding to the physical quantity . "On the other hand", they continue, 
if the state of the system is a superposition of eigenstates of , "we can no longer 
speak of the physical quantity having a particular value". After a few more 
considerations, they state that "the usual conclusion from this in QM is that when 
4Regarding the objective reality, the quantum non-locality denies the philosophical thesis that reality 
can be fully understood; and it seems to rejects the philosophical principle of suﬃcient reason, which 
goes back to classical Greek philosophy and says that every event has a cause.
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the momentum of a particle is known, its coordinate has no physical reality " .  
We are left therefore, according to EPR,  with two alternatives: 
 
EPR’s central dilemma: "From this follows that either (1) the quantum- 
mechanical description of reality given by the wave function is not com- 
plete or (2) when the operators corresponding to two physical quantities 
do not commute the two quantities cannot have simultaneous reality. 
 
They justify this by reasoning that "if both of them had simultaneous reality, and 
thus deﬁnite values,these values would enter into the complete description, according 
to the condition for completeness". And in the crucial step of the reasoning: "If  
then the wave function provided such a complete description of reality it would 
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